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ABSTRACT
In July of 2002, the California State Legislature passed the "California Clean Cars Bill," the
first law in the United States to regulate carbon dioxide as a vehicular pollutant. California's
vehicular standards have implications across the country; at least eight other states have
committed to adopt them. The passage of the legislation was as controversial as it was
groundbreaking. Over the course of the year and a half that the bill was in the state
legislature, environmentalists and the auto industry fought for the public's support of their
positions. Although the auto industry had the benefit of a multi-million dollar advertising
budget, environmentalists adopted tactics that proved more effective in the battle for
Californians' support. This thesis describes the environmentalists' coalition-building and
problem-definition tactics and how they enabled the environmentalists to gain public
support.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2002 California passed the California Clean Cars Bill. The Clean Cars Bill was the
first law in the United States to authorize the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from
automobiles. California's adoption of any standards limiting vehicular carbon dioxide
emissions had the potential to prompt changes in personal vehicles across North America.
Given the auto industry's high economic stakes in the legislative outcome and their
economic and political clout, one would expect that auto manufacturers would have been
able to block the legislation. But, in the end, their well-financed campaign to convince the
public to oppose the bill did not prevail. Environmentalists who supported the bill leveraged
other, more influential resources and successfully convinced the California public and
legislature that the legislation was important and that it was California's responsibility to pass
it. This thesis proposes that the way environmentalists framed their position to the public
engendered a wide coalition of supporters and effectively neutralized the opposition
argument.
Importance
The Clean Cars Bill represents a significant step in air pollution policy in the United States.
Historically, pollutants have been characterized by their direct negative impacts on human
health. This legislation formally expands the definition of pollutant to address a chemical's
contribution to a global environmental concern-climate change. Understanding the
dynamics surrounding the passage of the legislation therefore contributes to the framework
for what may be a new series of environmental policies in the United States.
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Climate change is the most serious environmental problem of the 21 st century. Over
the past two decades scientists from around the world have collaborated to examine
processes, evidence, and impacts of human-induced climate change. The scientific
community has reached a consensus; they agree that humans are changing the earth's climate
by adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.
Greenhouse gases are naturally occurring chemicals that absorb heat from the sun
after it enters the Earth's atmosphere. This heat retention warms the atmosphere, a
phenomenon known as the greenhouse effect. Although the greenhouse effect occurs
naturally and is necessary to support life on Earth, human activity has intensified the amount
of heat-trapping chemicals in the atmosphere to the extent that they are affecting the climate
on a global level. Evidence from long-term sources including ice-cores and tree rings concur
with data that scientists have collected over the past fifty years including atmospheric gas
measurements, shifting populations of flora and fauna, mean temperature changes, and ice
sheet melting, which indicate that the Earth's temperature is rising at an unprecedented rate.
Furthermore, evidence indicates that human activity is the driving force behind global
warming.
Human-induced climate change refers to an exponential increase in greenhouse gases
in the Earth's atmosphere that is the result of human activity. The most significant human
contribution to greenhouse gases comes from carbon dioxide that is released when humans
burn fossil fuels.'
Countries across the world have mobilized to respond to climate change. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is an international panel of scientists
'According to Environmental Defense, carbon dioxide comprised 83% of the United States' total
greenhouse gas emissions in 2000. (DeCiccio and An 2002, 2).
10
that has worked to refine the scientific tools and understandings about climate change and
its impacts. Evidence from IPCC research led representatives of countries from across the
globe came together in 1997 in Japan to create a strategy for an international response to
climate change. This result was was the Kyoto Protocol, which called for countries to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions to 5% below 1990 levels by 2012. The United States participated
in the convention that developed the terms of the Protocol, but has not ratified it. However,
the Kyoto Protocol went into effect in February 2005 when over 55% of convention
members (representing 55% of the global emissions producers) ratified and adopted it.
The United States produces 25% of global greenhouse gas emissions but is home to
about five percent of the world's people (U.S. Department of State 2002). The U.S. is one of
the wealthiest and most powerful countries in the world. But, the federal government refuses
to focus its resources on addressing climate change. Instead, local and state-level initiatives
comprise the U.S. response to climate change.
States are somewhat counterintuitive venues for climate change policy since climate
change is an international problem and has been largely addressed through negotiations
between countries. However, Barry Rabe proposes that in the United States, state policies
are laying the groundwork for a nationwide network of climate change response (Rabe
2002). His report Greenhouse & Statehouse emphasizes the role that individual state policies
play in setting precedents for other states and for future federal policies. He also suggests
that states benefit from being able to design policies that appropriately address state-specific
economics and politics.
California has consistently been at the vanguard of U.S. air policy and vehicular
regulations. California adopted its Air Pollution Control Act in 1947 and passed its first
automotive emissions regulations in 1959. Its air pollution policies established the
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framework for the federal Clean Air Act. During the establishment of the federal 1970 Clean
Air Act, it was clear that states would be responsible for pollution reduction. But,
automobile manufacturers lobbied to prevent the possibility of 50 state-level standards. The
Act resolved this by separating pollution sources into two categories: mobile (vehicular) and
stationary (manufacturing plants and factories). The federal government would regulate
mobile sources and states were to be responsible for stationary sources. California, whose
vehicular regulations predated federal pollution laws, could maintain its own vehicular
standards, as long as they were at least as stringent as federal standards. The Clean Air Act
authorizes other states to adopt California standards in lieu of federal ones. So, any
vehicular regulation for clean air that California adopts has nationwide implications.
Transportation accounts for about one-third of the United States' total greenhouse
gas emissions (DeCiccio 2002, 2). Within the transportation sector, cars and light trucks
comprise 62% of greenhouse gas emissions (DeCiccio 2002, 3). Taken together, these data
suggest that the United States might significantly reduce its contribution to global climate
change by reducing emissions from personally owned vehicles. The federal government has
refused to address climate change with policies that limit greenhouse gas emissions. The
federal government has also refused to raise CAFE standards (Corporate Average Fuel
Efficiency), which regulate the fuel efficiency of auto makers' fleets. These standards have
been the focus of many environmental organizations' attempts to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions since carbon dioxide is emitted at a one-to-one ratio with fuel burned. But, their
attempts have been futile; federal fuel efficiency standards have not been raised since 1985.
In Rabe's assessment of state climate policies, he asserts that
Few sectors are as important to climate change as transportation, which is
responsible for approximately twenty-six percent of total U.S. anthropogenic
GHG emissions. At the same time, no sector may be so impervious to policy
innovation at the state level, given the American affinity for driving cars and
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trucks and traditional reliance on the federal government to set relevant
regulatory standards. (Rabe 2002, 26)
According to a report from the Union of Concerned Scientists, California's largest
source of greenhouse gas emissions is vehicles (Bedsworth 2004).2 While approximately
one-third of greenhouse gas emission in the United States comes from the transportation
sector, about 6 0% of California's greenhouse gas emissions come from the transportation
sector (Pew Center on Global Climate Change). Given California's leadership in air pollution
policy and the extent to which its transportation sector emits greenhouse gases, it is not
surprising that California would adopt the first law to limit greenhouse gases from personal
vehicles.
In addition to its importance for climate change policy in the United States, this case
merits attention for its character as a high-stakes state-level environmental policy. The
current trend in the United States is for states and local governments to address major
environmental problems that are ignored by the national government. Automobile
manufacturers and environmental advocates both faced high risks in the outcome of the
legislation. Automakers recognized the potential for the legislation to force them to adopt
new technologies and dramatically shift their production and design plans. Furthermore, not
all of the auto manufacturers have the technology necessary to comply with the standards
that the legislation requires. The auto industry's contemplation of a ballot initiative and its
eventual filing of a lawsuit to overturn the bill after it was passed illustrate the seriousness of
the industry's opposition.
For environmentalists, the legislation offered great benefits but also had the potential
to result in major political costs. If the legislation passed, it would be a major step forward in
2 According to the UCS report, about 40% of California's carbon dioxide emissions and more than 30% of the
state's total greenhouse gas emissions come from vehicles.
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climate change policy. But, if it did not pass, they feared that the Bush Administration and
others at the national level would use its failure in their argument against climate change
policy, saying that even California, the leader of all environmental policy, thought that
regulating greenhouse gas emissions was a bad idea.
Framework: Environmental Policy Making in the U.S.
Policy making in the United States involves a complex set of interactions among interest
groups with policy agendas, legislators concerned about reelection, and periodic
opportunities for major policy changes (Kingdon 1995).
Elected officials make final decisions about which policies will become law. A
rational decision-making model of environmental policy-making would suggest that these
decisions would be the outcomes of a process in which policy makers respond to an evident
problem, consume available information, and then identify the best solution. But, accounts
of actual policy-making indicate that decision-makers in environmental policy-making
processes rarely act according to a rational model. Instead, elected officials weigh the level
of public interest in issues and the impacts of various decisions on their reputations and on
their prospects for reelection.
John Iingdon (1995) proposes a model of policy-making in which policy advocates
promote policies designed to advance their agendas. When an opportunity arises a policy
entrepreneur connects a developed policy to a specific current problem, framing it as an
appropriate solution. Opportunities may be the result of extreme events that shed light on
an existing problem. They may also be reports or studies that present compelling findings.
Champions within the body of decision-makers also offer the kinds of opportunities that
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policy entrepreneurs seek. In this case, legislators may push a policy into the public agenda
because of its concurrence with their or their constituents' values and interests.
As environmental policies become actual legislative possibilities, interest groups
attempt to convince undecided legislators to support their position. According to Judith
Layzer (2002), the goal of problem definition is to convince "the previously unaware and
undecided" since those who are already involved in a policy debate are unlikely to change
their minds even with new information. Decision-makers are responsible for carrying out the
wishes of their constituents or risk their popularity. But, since decision-makers who are
uncertain about their position on a policy pay attention to the impact of legislation on their
constituents (or at least to the impact of the decisions on their constituents' impression of
them), interest groups target the public in campaigns to define the problem and present
appropriate solutions. To do this, policy entrepreneurs or interest groups attempt to get
people to adopt their understanding of a problem and endorse the response they advocate.
Deborah Stone (1997) proposes that interest groups use story-telling to create a
perception of a situation. She suggests that "(b)ecause politics is driven by how people
interpret information, much political activity is an effort to control interpretations" (Stone
1997, 28). Baumgartner (1993) explains that any given policy may have meanings and
implications that differ across groups. Therefore, he posits, different policy positions result
from different understandings of what a policy means. Groups control which of the many
possible meanings people will adopt by telling stories that call attention to the specific
implications that support the group's agenda.
In environmental policy debates, there are two prevailing approaches to problem
definition. Industry groups tell stories about economic distress and loss of individual
freedoms that will result from restrictive policies while environmentalists tell stories of the
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negative impacts on communities that will occur unless government intervenes (Layzer
2002). The goal of such campaigns is to convince individuals in such a way that they will act
on their feelings about the policy in question. The desired outcome is that actions such as
phone calls, letter writing, protesting, etc., will communicate intense constituent interest to
decision-makers.
Wealthy members of the private sector have an inherent upper hand in successful
campaigns to influence policy because the costs associated with advertising efforts are high.
In The Sound of Money, Darrell West and Burdett Loomis (1999) argue that "moneyed
interests" can "convey their interests more clearly and effectively than less affluent groups or
organizations...(T)hose who control the narrative...determine the policy." Launching
successful campaigns to convince an influential share of the citizenry of a specific position
on a problem is often costly. Furthermore, private interests often frame their positions in
terms of classic values such as freedom from government intervention and freedom to
pursue happiness as one pleases.
Non-profit environmental organizations often have less money and staff time to
spend on costly advertising campaigns. In examining environmental policy-making at state
levels, William Lowry (1992) observes that private interest groups' desire to maintain the
status quo will out-compete the public goods interest groups' desire for policy changes
because industry groups better able to mobilize financial resources quickly and send a
message to an existing network of local and state decision-makers. Environmental groups
that focus on national policy issues, on the other hand, often have to mobilize local support
and create a new network. However, most major national environmental organizations
maintain state offices or affiliates that keep them connected with state leaders and state
issues.
16
In a problem-definition policy model, the group that aims to challenge the status quo
will attempt to broaden the scope of an issue to attract the attention of and gain support
fiom affiliated interests (Baumgartner 1993). To do this successfully, an interest group may
have to redefine their story about policy problem to address values and priorities of targeted
allies. The successful passage of the California Clean Cars legislation presents a case in
which competing interests fought to define a policy problem. This thesis examines how
environmentalists neutralized industry's argument that the legislation would severely affect
C alifornians' freedoms and instead convinced the public and legislators that emissions
regulations would benefit them.
Methodology
Content analysis of various media: Evidence from media, including reports of the legislation and
associated arguments, editorials, and letters to the editor provide insight into the kinds of
discussions that were taking place among members of the public about the legislation.
Additionally, advertisements about the bill provide information about the messages and
strategies that interests used to convince the public to adopt their positions. Together, these
sources show the kinds of arguments that drove public opinion in relation to the legislation.
To gather news perspectives that represent the opinions about the legislation, I conducted
searches using LexisNexis and EbscoHost databases of newspapers looking for references to
"AB 1058," "AB 1493," "California emissions regulations," and "greenhouse gas" between
January 1, 2001 and January 1, 2003.
Polling data: Polls and surveys provide insight into the changing opinions of the public. The
Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) is an independent nonpartisan research
organization focused on improving public policy in California. It conducted statewide
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surveys focused on the environment in 2000, 2002, and 2004. These surveys asked
Californians to respond to statements about global warming and the need for governmental
response. The 2002 survey specifically asked respondents whether they "favor or oppose a
state law requiring all automakers to further reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases from
new cars in California by 2009" (Baldassare 2002, 14). Although this same question was not
asked in either the 2000 or the 2004 surveys, similar questions enable comparison across
years. In 2000 the survey asked respondents "From what you know about global climate
change or global warming, which of the following four statements comes closest to your
opinion: change is serious, need immediate action; enough evidence, need some action; need
more research before acting; concern is unwarranted; don't know/other" (Baldassare 2000,
16). In 2004, the survey asks respondents "What about the state law that requires all
automakers to further reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases from new cars in California?
Do you support or oppose the law?" (Baldassare 2004, 8). It is likely that people respond
differently to a question about the general idea of governmental response to global warming
than they do to the proposal of a specific policy question. Nevertheless, polling data
provides relevant measure of how the issue's salience changed with the emergence of a
policy proposal.
Interviews: Interviews with individuals who were involved in the passage of, support for, and
opposition to the legislation offer opportunities to examine firsthand accounts of interest
group dynamics and strategies. I conducted in person and telephone interviews with
representatives from environmental organizations involved in the development and support
of the legislation, decision- and policy-makers, and a representative from the automobile
industry. Because auto makers have filed a lawsuit against the State of California challenging
the legislation, officials and some interest group representatives are hesitant to discuss the
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bill so there was a limitation to this method of information-collection and I used a limited
number of informants. However, their contributions and insights provide invaluable
resources.
Question
Environmentalists and the automobile industry each faced risks in the Clean Cars legislation.
Given the automobile industry's financial stakes and the relative size of its budget to oppose
the bill, one might expect that auto industry's position to have prevailed in the public arena.
Initially, the automobile industry seemed to be winning the battle for public support. But, in
the end, the environmental advocates gained the majority of public and legislative support.
What elements of the interest groups' actions and strategies led to their ability to overcome
industry's control of the public perception of the policy?
In answering this question, this thesis analyzes the legislative process as it related to
interest group activities. This paper also examines the approach that environmentalists took
to pass a piece of controversial legislation that has nationwide implications.
Argument
Two factors led to the surprising outcome in which the environmentalists' position won
public support. First, was the coordination between environmental organizations on a
unified set of goals and their capacity to broaden their base of support Second,
environmentalists crafted a more convincing causal story by making a compelling case for
the legislation and by directly challenging the credibility of the auto industry. Through their
messages environmentalists successfully undermined the automobile industry's opposition.
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Testing the Argument
I examine the importance of the environmental community's coalition-building in support of
the bill by looking at comments from environmental organizations and decision-makers
about the passage of the legislation. If the bill might have passed without coordination
across organizations, or if the collaboration that occurred did not make a difference in the
outcome, coordination will not be highlighted in respondents' accounts of the bill's passage.
If the problem definition advanced by environmentalists contributed to the public's
support of the legislation, we would expect to see the language and stories that the
environmental advocates used in their campaign reflected in other statements of support. If
neither the efforts by the environmentalists nor the efforts by the auto industry affected the
public's perception of global warming and California policy, we would not detect elements
of environmentalist stories in non-campaign statements of support.
If the environmental organizations' focus on the automobile industry's lack of
credibility contributed to the success of the legislation, we would expect to see news articles,
editorials, and letters to the editor that call attention to the issue of credibility and use the
auto industry's history as rationale against their position. Alternatively, if the public is
immune to "mud-slinging," questions about the automakers' credibility would not be
replicated in the media. Instead, media accounts would be dominated by unrelated
arguments.
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THE ROAD TO CLEANER CARS
In 2000 George W. Bush won the U.S. presidential election and Russell Long, the Executive
Director of Bluewater Network, knew that there would not be any progress on policies to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for at least four years. In thinking about other ways to
tackle the problem of vehicular emissions, Bluewater came up with a strategy to take
advantage of California's special status under the Clean Air Act that authorizes it to be the
only state permitted to create its own vehicular emissions standards (Long 2005). The
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, which established CAFE standards, prohibits
states from regulating fuel economy and says that only the federal government shall have the
ability to regulate fuel economy. So, rather than addressing the issue of fuel economy, Long
targeted greenhouse gases as pollutants. In this way California could legitimately pursue
regulations to limit carbon dioxide emissions.
Cold Start
Bluewater Network is a 10-person environmental organization that focuses on "air and water
quality problems caused by the transportation sector" (Bluewater 2005). When Bluewater
staff drafted the Clean Car legislation and sent it out to key California legislators, they
scarcely received acknowledgement. As they targeted a wider group of potential champions,
they found a proponent in first-term Assemblywoman Fran Pavley. Assemblywoman Pavley
was a retired school teacher from Agoura Hills in Southern California. Pavley introduced the
legislation to the State Assembly in February 2001. The legislation called for the Air
Resources Board (ARB) to develop standards to achieve the "maximum feasible"
greenhouse gas emission reductions from passenger vehicles in California.
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Bluewater Network thought that the legislation would have the best chance of
passing if it had formal support from a diversity of sources. They created a list of kinds of
institutions, organizations, and individuals whose support, they believed, would make a
difference to the legislations' outcome. The first step was to get the other major
environmental organizations on board. However, the mainstream environmental groups
were initially reluctant to support the legislation. Developing a coalition that could
overcome internal differences and successfully entrain external supporters was difficult
(Long 2005; Hwang 2005).
Bluewater Network tried to get other environmental organizations to sign on as
supporters in anticipation of the legislation's first hearing with the Committee on
Transportation. In a conference call with representatives from major environmental
organizations before the first hearing, it became clear that the larger environmental advocacy
community was not behind the bill. All of the environmentalists on the conference call
recognized that if they won it would be a big win. But some were concerned that the risk of
losing was even bigger. A common response to the legislation from mainstream national
environmental group representatives was the concern that the legislation tried to do too
much too quickly without an established set of internal supporters in the legislature.
Another prominent concern was that the stakes were too high to risk going forward without
a high probability of winning. The fear was that if the California legislation failed, opponents
to vehicular regulation could use the issue's failure in California as support for the argument
against greenhouse emissions regulations at the federal level.
At this point, there was a struggle within the environmental community to
contextualize and define the impact of legislation. Bluewater wanted the national
environmental organizations to understand and embrace the bill as an opportunity for
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national progress in climate change policy and to embrace it with a spirit of leadership. But,
the other environmental leaders wanted Bluewater to see the bill as they saw it-risky and
potentially in competition with existing strategies for climate change policy. The national
environmental groups asked Bluewater to withdraw the legislation. It was unlikely that other
environmental organizations would publicly disclaim the legislation by advancing their
position on the legislation. Bluewater went forward with the legislation.
Bluewater gathered a handful of local and state-level environmental groups as
supporters in time for the Committee on Transportation hearing. Big names among the
environmental community included California Public Interest Research Group, Sierra Club
California, Greenpeace, and Coalition for Clean Air. Listed as opponents to the bill were:
the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the California Chamber of Commerce, General
Motors, and the Western States Petroleum Organization (California State Assembly 2001).
According to one respondent, the auto industry showed "token opposition" by registering
their opposition to the bill (Oglesby 2005). They did not see the legislation as a serious threat
at this time (Anonymous 2005).
Acceleration: Committee on Transportation
C)ne reason that the auto industry may not have taken the bill seriously was that Pavley
introduced it in the Committee on Transportation. Environmental legislation rarely emerges
from the California State Assembly Committee on Transportation (Long 2005). The hearing
was contentious; moderate Democrats who supported the intent of the bill were concerned
that the legislation would give the Air Resources Board (ARB), "nameless, faceless
bureaucrats," unchecked authority to create vehicular regulations (Oglesby 2005). In
response, Assemblyman Simitian, the Democrat committee-member from Palo Alto who
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co-authored the bill with Pavley, suggested that the Committee include a requirement that
ARB present the regulations to the legislature for review and that there be a one year delay
before the regulations would go into effect. The Committee also amended the initial
legislative language to add "cost effective" to the legislative mandate for "maximum feasible
reduction of carbon dioxide emitted from passenger vehicles." These changes framed the
legislation as economically and environmentally reasonable. The bill passed with a vote of 10
to 7.
Once the bill passed through the Committee on Transportation, in April 2001,
national environmental organizations and the automotive industry realized that it had
potential to advance in the state legislature. The automobile manufacturing industry and its
member companies began to take the threat of the legislation more seriously and initiated a
media campaign in opposition of the proposed legislation. They would have to work hard to
convince the undecided members of the Democrat-dominated houses of the legislature and
the Democratic governor, who claimed to not have a position on the bill, to oppose the bill.
Simultaneously, the environmentalists that had not initially listed themselves as supporters of
the bill registered as supporters.
If the Bluewater Network had not been able to gain the support of the other
environmental groups, it is questionable whether the bill's initial momentum would have led
to the successful passage of the legislation. The other organizations brought with them
existing networks of support and connections that led to gain additional support for the
legislation. They also brought with them resources to support advertising. And, they
brought their credibility.
The effect of a large handful of environmental organizations with interests including
habitat protection, clean air, environmental health, and corporate environmental
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responsibility each advocating for the same policy was the perception that many independent
voices were calling for the same end. A representative from the Alliance for Automobile
Manufacturing (AAM) shared his perspective on the effectiveness of global warming as a call
to action, saying that the great thing about climate change as a policy motivator is that
environmentalists can leverage any major event in the name of climate change policy
(Anonymous 2005). The automotive industry and its allies' singularly economic interest did
not counter the diversity of interests that supported the bill. Yet, the public conflict about
the legislation did not focus on climate change. A handful of letters to the editor questioned
the validity of climate change, but scientific challenge was not part of the industry's
opposition campaign. Therefore, supporters of the legislation benefited from the ability to
point to climate change impacts and data about California's contribution to global climate
change without having to defend climate change science. In appeals for public buy-in,
neither side framed the policy debate as an issue of science. Environmentalists framed it as
an issue of clean air and pollution regulation and industry framed it as an issue of consumer
cost and choice.
Getting the Public on Board
For the remainder of 2001, the environmentalists' support was mainly symbolic; the
organizations were engaged in their own campaigns and the legislation was neither
controversial nor high-profile enough to necessitate their active support. They signed onto
the legislation as supporters and allowed Bluewater to use their names to bolster the bill's
credibility. But, when the auto industry intensified its opposition to the legislation in the
second year, the other environmental organizations became more action-oriented.
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The environmental groups had a decentralized approach to promoting the
legislation. They held a series of conference calls to discuss their public position and strategy
over the two years that the legislation was in the State Legislature. According to participants
in these calls, there was as much disagreement about the terms of the legislation as there was
agreement about its necessity. Outside of the group calls, the environmental groups
conducted public advertising campaigns individually and reached out to build support from
their respective connections.
In talking with leaders of environmental support efforts about how specific non-
environmental groups and individuals joined in support of the legislation, each organization
knew which supporting individual or group they enabled, but could only speculate about
which of their colleagues deserved credit for other supporters. However disperse it was, this
approach resulted in a coalition supporters from the media, unions, legislators, Hollywood
celebrities, city and county governments, water and air districts, and businesses. By the 2002
hearings, registered supporters included American Lung Association,
Architects/Designers/Planners for Social Responsibility, the Bay Area Air Quality
Management District, California Conservation Voters, the Cities of Los Angeles and San
Francisco, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and many others. Respondents from
environmental organizations agree that such a diverse set of supporters could not have been
achieved had the numerous environmental organizations not joined to support the
legislation.
The automotive industry also reached out to its allies, but its approach was more
centralized. The automaker industry relied on established connections with the United Auto
Workers, auto dealer organizations, and Chambers of Commerce. The opposition network
however, was less diverse than that of the bill's supporters. In the beginning of the 2002
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hearings, the opposition had grown to include the Automobile Club of Southern California,
California Manufacturers and Technology Association, California Automobile Association,
and the San Diego Industrial Environmental Association. The opposition coalition had a
narrower scope than the support coalition; all of the members opposed the bill based on
economic interests.
According to one legislative staffer, the diversity of supporters led legislators who did
not identify as environmentalists to find reasons to support the bill. Perhaps, she suggested,
an Assemblymember felt strongly about healthcare, but did not know or care about climate
change; seeing that the American Lung Association and the Nurses Association supported
the bill might lead to this legislator's vote (Rishoff 2005).
Over the next year and a half, supporters and opponents of the legislation mounted
campaigns to gain organizational allies and convince the public of their positions. To do
this, both sides framed their positions as being in the public interest. However, they
characterized the public differently. The auto industry reached out to the public as
consumers, calling on them to stand up for their freedom to purchase what they want and
drive how they want, without government intervention. The environmentalists reached out
to the public as citizens with a sense of environmental responsibility. A press release issued
by the Alliance for Automobile Manufacturers stated that "Automakers Will Pursue
Litigation to Protect California Consumers" (2002). Meanwhile, press releases from
supporting organizations such as Environmental Defense framed legislation as a simple
opportunity for Californians to do the right thing ("CA Green Groups Call on Davis to Take
Action on Global Warming" 2002).
In its effort to characterize the legislation and encourage opposition, the auto
industry told the public that the legislation would result in limited choices and high prices for
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consumers. They claimed that the bill's measures would not produce any tangible
environmental improvements. And, they used information from an unrelated policy analysis
document 3 that the Air Resource Board produced to paint an undesirable image of the
implications of the Clean Cars legislation.
Environmentalists communicated two messages through their advertisements, press
releases, and public comments. Their argument was predicated on the need to respond to
climate change so they identified compelling impacts of climate change in California, such as
the diminishing snow pack in the Sierras, increased drought, and increasing frequency of
heat-related illnesses. Californians, they claimed, wanted to prevent such impacts. Therefore,
their first message was that the legislation pursued something that Californians already
wanted and believed in. The second message was that the automakers' opposition to making
cleaner cars was the only thing standing in the way of cleaner cars for everyone.
Whether or not climate change was actually happening was not a prominent element
of either campaign. However, California's response to it was. The auto industry argued that
the reductions in emissions that would result from the legislation would be a fraction of
what would be necessary to counter climate change. The environmentalists argued that the
legislation was a step towards lessening the problem. The auto industry claimed that only
federal policies could have real impacts (Anonymous 2005). The environmentalists pointed
to the lack of federal action on climate change and the auto industry's obstruction of any
such policies, and called on California to take the steps that the rest of the country could
follow (Bridges 2001).
3 The advertisement refers to a document from the ARB. The actual section that it refers to, "Task 3:
Petroleum Reduction Options" is part of a study entitled Reducing California's Petroleum Dependence.
This study was not related to the California Clean Cars legislation.
28
Auto industry ads promoted a 1-800-number for citizens to voice their opposition to
the bill. The number connected callers directly with legislators' offices. The auto industry's
campaign resulted in a flood of citizen opposition calls. By advertising on the radio during
morning commute hours, the auto industry was able to connect with their target audience,
Californians who depended on and regularly spent a portion of their day in cars. The "a.m.
shock jocks" responded to the advertisements, adding their own oppositional commentary
to the legislation (Rishoff 2005). Legislators complained of having their phones constantly
busy because they received so many calls to protest the legislation. The Riverside Press-
E:nterprise reported that "advertising campaigns by businesses interests and condemnation of
the bill by radio talk-show hosts generated 'tens of thousands' of emails and voice messages"
in opposition (Garrett 2002). Assemblywoman Pavely's office also received calls from
concerned legislators wanting explanations for the level of opposition. The most visible
evidence that the auto industry's message resonated with Californians was a caravan of
opponents who drove to Sacramento show their opposition to the bill.
The problem-definition model suggests the target of advertising and campaigning is
those members of the public and decision-makers who do not have an opinion about the
policy. It is therefore not surprising that the San Diego Union-Tribune, a prominent
conservative newspaper, agreed with the industry argument against the legislation. But, if the
newspaper was expressing its own opinions without influence from the auto industry, there
would not be a distinguishable connection between the ways that the newspaper and the
industry crafted their arguments. In fact, the newspaper behaved just as this framework
would predict; they used the same language and arguments as the automakers employed in
their messages in their opinions on the legislation: "What does this mean for Californians?
Higher prices and more hassles with no improvement in health, safety, or environmental
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quality to show for it...Forcing Californians to pay more for cars and fuels is bad enough.
Forcing them to pay more to satisfy regulations that do more harm than good is something
only policy-makers could think of' (Green 2002). The opinion-writer concurs with the auto
industry, asserting that the legislation victimizes the California automobile consumer and hat
Californians should be wary of bureaucratic policy-makers. This opinion piece, like the
industry argument, targeted Californians who were concerned for their pocketbooks and
who were suspicious of government. The messages intended to play on these sentiments.
A prominent auto industry print advertisement published in April 2002 featured an
image of a family of four emerging from their SUV along with the message "Who Decides
What You Drive?"4 The ad went on to tell middle class families why AB 1058 is bad for
them. It cited a study that the ARB conducted regarding energy dependence and fuel
consumption reduction. The advertisement told readers that if their elected officials don't
prevent the passage of AB 1058, they would be in danger of having to pay per-mile and per-
gallon taxes, extra fees on new vehicles, and they might have to comply with lower speed
limits. In addition to costing more, working Californians would suffer if the legislation was
passed because their choice of vehicles would be limited and the cars that they could drive
would be smaller and less safe. The advertisement concluded with a plea for readers to call a
toll-free number and tell their elected officials to stop the legislation, which the
advertisement repeatedly identified by its number.
An opinion piece by Kenneth Green in the LA Times built upon the argument the
auto industry made in its statement of opposition to the legislature-that the legislation
4 This advertisement sponsored by California Chamber of Commerce, United Auto Workers, Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers, Specialty Equipment Market Association, California Motor Car Dealers
Association, California Manufacturers and Technology Association, California Highway Users Conference,
and California Taxpayers Association. Provided electronically by Russell Long.
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would not actually produce significant improvements in global warming. "Even if everyone
in California stopped driving, or we could eliminate all greenhouse gas emissions from
California vehicles, worldwide emissions would drop by less than one quarter of one
percent...The bill, AB 1058, is heralded as a way to combat global warming. In reality,
California drivers will be more affected by this bill than the environment" (Green 2002b).
The argument about the impact of emissions reductions on global climate change is more
technical than the industry's argument about loss of choice. It challenges the rational nexus
between the bill and the broader goal of reducing climate change.
Revving Up
The majority of articles and advertisements about the bill emerged in May and June of 2002.
In May NRDC aired a television advertisement showing "a family in a car showroom, where
a slick salesman tells them they can't have the modern, clean car they asked for because the
car companies won't make it" ("New Television Ads Ridicule Automakers' Fight Against
Clean Cars" 2002). This advertisement may be a response to industry's "Who Decides What
You Drive?" advertisement. It targets average families and provides an alternative
perspective to the auto industry's claims. Environmentalists also held a "truth rally" to
counter the auto industry's claims about the bill's impacts ("Auto Pollution Bill Supporters
Challenge Industry Smear Campaign on Capitol Steps" 2002).
At this time, non-environmentalist supporters became more visible in campaigns to
broaden the appeal of and support for the legislation. The Environmental Entrepreneurs, an
NRDC partner organization of environmentally active business leaders from Silicon Valley,
issued press releases and appeared at functions in support of the legislation. Their voice
presented a counter argument to the auto industry claim that the bill would have negative
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economic impacts. As business leaders who did not have a direct stake in the bill's outcome,
the Environmental Entrepreneurs spoke of the bill in terms of its prudence and business
sense. This message, according to NRDC's Roland Hwang, was particularly important to
undecided legislators from Silicon Valley who were concerned about the economic impacts
of the legislation (2005).
In May 2002, the California Motor Car Dealers Association published an
advertisement that featured famous used car salesman Cal Worthington and his equally
famous tiger. In the ad he cautioned readers, "WARNING! I'm Scared To Death and You
Should Be Too." In his statement, Worthington told consumers that "politicians in
Sacramento" want to prevent them from buying and driving the vehicle of their choice.
Worthington wanted to protect Californian consumers from decision-makers who want to
take away their choice. This advertisement urged Californians to call the same toll-free as the
"Who Decides What You Drive?" advertisement used to tell "elected officials to vote no on
AB 1058."
Environmental advocates then introduced a media campaign that both defended the
bill and challenged the auto industry's claims. They addressed misinformation from the auto
industry's campaign by establishing that the automobile industry's had a long history of
inflating costs and other negative impacts associated with regulations. A paid advertisement
from the California League of Conservation Voters featured a picture of a crash dummy
with the headline "They must think we're a bunch of dummies." This advertisement typifies
the environmentalists' approach to reaching the public; they included themselves in the
public through the use of "we," a strategy that creates trust between the messenger and the
receiver of the information. The advertisement proceeded to lay out a history of the car
companies' opposition to safety and environmental regulations including seat belts, smog-
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reducing technologies, and air bags. It then announced that "In 2002, they're using their
money and influence to prevent the state government from cutting the pollution that causes
global warming." By presenting the history of opposition to automotive features that were
then standard and juxtaposing the industry's current opposition to the proposed emissions
regulations, the League of Conservation Voters communicated that auto makers had a
history of advocating against the public interest. They also offered hope for the public good.
The message was we can win this one just like we won with seatbelts, air bags, and smog
controls.
Built into the advertisement was a sense the argument's credibility. It quoted
prominent newspapers' negative reactions to the auto industry and closed by presenting
"The Truth About AB 1058," a series of bullet points about what the bill will and will not
do. The advertisement focused on the money, influence, and power of the auto industry and
the bill's improvements for communities and health.
The context of the campaign informs the public's response to it. The bill's passage
overlapped with the emergence and build-up of the Enron scandal. Corporate wariness was
heightened in California by the end of 2001. Environmental supporters of the bill took
advantage of this as they asked the public to question the reliability and credibility of the
auto industry. For example, Natural Resources Defense Council based an advertisement on
the idea that the auto industry was not trustworthy and had a history of self-interested
opposition. It said, "We can't stop the car companies' hot air...But we can clean up the
global warming from their tailpipes." This advertisement quoted past auto industry
responses to currently accepted automobile features and to the proposed carbon dioxide
pollution regulations to support the idea the industry's position on all regulations was
opposition.
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Another tactic in support advertisements was to use industry arguments against the
bill's opponents. In environmental policy debates, industry often characterizes
environmentalists as doomsdayers who are overly concerned about a problem, which puts
environmentalists in a position of having to defend their concerns and the need for
regulations. But, in the "Hot Air" advertisement, NRDC called the auto industry's "can't do
attitude" and claims of higher costs and less safety a "doomsday prophesy." An editorial
from the San Francisco Chronicle echoed the NRDC ad, saying "Amid prophesies of doom
from automakers a 'clean air' bill to regulate greenhouse car emissions seems to be trucking
nonstop through the legislature" ("A Real Smoke Screen" 2002). A print ad by the Sierra
Club and the California League of Conservation Voters co-opted the auto industry's
definition of the policy as diminishing consumer choices. This ad issued a "Consumer
Warning" and urged Californians, "Don't let carmakers deny us the choice of cleaner cars."
Additional refutation of the auto industry's arguments came from the Environmental
Entrepreneurs. "E2, as the group is known, presented undecided Assembly members with
business leaders -- mostly Silicon Valley financiers and tech executives -- who supported the
bill. That gave politicians a defense against the charge that they were anti-business" (Kwan
2002). E2 did not have the same power and clout as the auto industry and its allies, but its
support and public statements did diminish the impact of the industry's economic arguments
in the press and for decision-makers.
Stalling
The auto industry thought its work to prevent the bill's passage was complete when
the bill did not move from the Assembly to the Senate for concurrence in early May 2002
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(Plungis 2002). The May 2002 monthly newsletter from Assemblywoman Pavley's office
included a statement from the Assemblywoman:
My auto emissions bill, AB 1058, has received an onslaught of opposition
from the automobile manufacturing industry the likes of which I could never
have imagined. I have been astonished and dismayed by the inflammatory
rhetoric and just plain lies that became the core of the industry's campaign
when debate on the truth of the bill was not going their way.
Legislative offices received record numbers of opposition faxes and phone calls (Long 2005).
The volume of opposing emails and phone calls convinced a number of legislators to
commit to not vote for AB 1058 (Garett 2002, Schrag 2002). An article in the Detroit News
reported, "A multi-million dollar advertising blitz and lobbying effort swayed enough
lawmakers in the state Assembly that the bill's sponsor has decided to delay the final vote on
the Senate's version" (Plungis 2002). Industry was surprised when the bill was revived in late
J une.
Restarting
John Burton, the President of the California State Senate and a lifetime California
politician, was a champion of AB 1058. This was not surprising given his environmental
voting record. John Burton's support created an opportunity for the bill's resurrection. He
used his power to revive and reintroduce the bill in the Senate (Ogelsby 2005; Long 2005).
With Burton's support, Assemblywoman Pavley took AB 1493, a bill that had been inactive
in the Senate, removed its contents, and replaced them with an amended version of AB
1058.
AB 1.493 had outlined the duties of the State Auditor. On June 29, 2002 existing
provisions of AB 1493 were completely deleted. Assemblywoman Pavley replaced them with
the language of the Clean Cars legislation. The new AB 1493 was fundamentally the same as
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AB 1058, but it included a few strategically crafted changes. It included a list of specific
actions that the Air Resources Board was prohibited from requiring within the regulations.
Prohibitions included imposing mandatory taxes or fees on vehicles, banning the sale of any
vehicle, imposing vehicle weight reductions, imposing trip reduction measures, and
mandating land use restrictions. The amended legislation also expanded the legislative review
to "give the legislature time to review the regulations and determine whether further
legislation should be enacted prior to the effectiveness date."
These amendments explicitly refuted the claims that the automobile industry made
throughout its opposition campaign: that SUVs would be banned, that taxes would be levied,
that there would be restrictions on trip times and lengths, and that vehicles would become
less safe through vehicle weight restrictions. The expansion of legislative review addressed
remaining concerns about granting the Air Resources Board unbounded authority.
The number change took advantage of the opposition campaign's focus on the bill's
number. Legislators were prepared to oppose AB 1058, but no legislator had received calls in
opposition to AB 1493. Sympathetic legislators were able to vote in favor of the bill as AB
1493 without being a recorded supporter of the tainted AB 1058. Both houses approved the
amended version within three days. Some newspapers applauded the cleverness of the
maneuver (Schrag 2002). Of course, not everyone was convinced. But, the Opinion's page of
the San Diego Union-Tribune, whose previous reporting had sympathized with the industry's
position, presented both supportive and opposing opinions: "Legislature declares war on
SUVs" (Hayes 2002) and "A step to counter greenhouse gases" (Schrag 2002).
Other reports of the bill's passage adopted the environmentalists' arguments and
validated the bill number change. The San Jose Mercury News reported, "While opponents
warned that the new rules could push up the costs of new SUVs and gas prices, lawmakers
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sought to defuse the criticism by explicitly preventing state regulators from using higher fees
or weight limits on the vehicles to meet the standards," the article referred to the
"parliamentary maneuver" to "tweak" the proposed legislation (Nissenbaum 2002). If the
public at-large was upset by the number change or the amended language, this sentiment was
not reflected in newspaper accounts of the decision. There is, however, evidence of
suspicion about the delay associated with the number change. Some articles questioned
whether the delay purposefully made it difficult for the automobile industry to register a
ballot referendum to overturn the law (Walters 2002), but comments from an auto industry
respondent indicate that logistical concerns did not prevent a ballot initiative (Anonymous
2005).
The broad coalition of external support, internal champions like John Burton, and
the neutralization of the auto industry's opposition argument coalesced. What John Kingdon
would refer to as a "window of opportunity" opened (Kingdon 1995). Suddenly, members
of the legislature could vote in favor of AB 1493 and gain the support of the diverse
coalition of advocates without being susceptible to the criticism of opponents. Democratic
Assemblyman Juan Vargas from San Diego had abstained from voting on AB 1058 when it
was on the Assembly floor in January 2002, but voted in favor of AB 1493 in June 2002. The
Assemblyman reported being contacted by a number of supporters ranging from Jesuits
priests to the leader of the Environmental Entrepreneurs as he made his voting decision
(Gardner 2002).
The Public Policy Institute of California released its 2002 Survey on the
Environment to the public on June 27, 2002, two days before the bill was revived as AB
1493. The survey reported that 62% of respondents "believe that there is enough evidence
that global climate change is real and that at least some action must be take" (PPIC 2002,
37
16). The 67% was an increase from 2000's finding that 57% of Californians felt this way
(PPIC 2000, 14). The 2002 Survey asked respondents whether they favored or opposed "a
state law requiring all automakers to further reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases from
new cars in California by 2009," 81% responded in support (PPIC 2002, 16).
According to a respondent from the AAM, the automobile industry took the poll
results seriously when they found out that the bill was revived in the Senate. The high rate
of support indicated that the legislation, which they had thought they had successfully
opposed, was likely to pass in the legislature and receive support from Gray Davis.
Furthermore, they realized that sponsoring a referendum to overturn the legislation in the
upcoming election was not likely to gain much public support.
The Governor in the Driver's Seat
The bill reached Governor Gray Davis, three months before the gubernatorial
election. Davis was in a close race with Bill Simon and needed differentiate himself from his
opponent and secure the environmental vote. News reports and environmentalists alike
wondered whether Davis would approve the bill. AB 1058 had attracted significant negative
attention in addition to the obvious support of environmentalists. Environmental groups
aggressively lobbied for the governor's support. "Environmental Defense, a leading member
of a broad coalition of environmental, religious, and consumer groups that have pushed for
AB 1493's passage, strongly encourages Gov. Davis to sign it into law" ("Most Important
Climate Bill in 20 Years Awaits Gov. Davis' Signature" 2002).
After much speculation about Davis' position, he signed it. Twice. The governor
held two public signing ceremonies on July 22' 2002-one in San Francisco and one in Los
Angeles. Celebrities, business leaders, and leaders in the environmental community attended
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the signings. According to administrative agency staff, the Governor only held signing
ceremonies for legislation that would result in positive publicity (Ogelsby 2005). That the
Governor decided in favor of the legislation after its contentious treatment by the public and
media is further evidence of the legislation's ultimate positive saliency. Davis' statements at
the signings echoed the messages of the environmental campaign:
The technology is available. It's affordable. And, it's widely utilized in other
countries. We're merely asking business to do what business does best:
innovate, compete, find solutions to problems and do it in a way that
strengthens the economy...Opponents of this bill say the sky is falling. But
they said that about unleaded gasoline. They said it about catalytic converters.
They said it about seat belts and air bags. But the sky is not falling. It's just
getting a whole lot cleaner. (Davis 2002)
He cited the auto industry's history of inflating impacts of regulations, called on California's
environmental leadership, and identified the local threats from global warming impacts.
Environmental organizations publicly applauded Davis for the leadership he exhibited by
supporting the bill (Valtin 2002). Supportive statements from the environmental contingent
tempered earlier negative press about Davis' environmental performance.
In the Back Seat: Industry's Response
When the bill passed from the legislature to the Governor, the automobile industry
published statements saying that they intended to launch a ballot initiative to overturn the
legislation. However, no such initiative appeared on the November ballot. The
environmentalists took advantage of one of the major rifts that existed within the auto
industry-several of the automobile manufacturers had made public commitments to
produce environmentally friendly automobiles. Within the AAM both Ford and Toyota had
made such commitments, and had used their environmentalism to gain a competitive
advantage over other manufacturers. The contradiction between these commitments and
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the companies' opposition to the legislation fueled the environmentalists' attacks on
automakers' credibility.
Ford Motor Company is currently run by Henry Ford's great grandson, William (Bill)
Clay Ford, Jr. Bill Ford has attempted to make Ford a leader in environmental automobile
manufacturing (Snyder 2004). He outlined a vision for Ford Motor Company that integrated
the concept of environmental sustainability and technological innovation into Ford's
leadership. In 1999, Ford was the first American company to withdraw from the Global
Climate Coalition, an industry-sponsored organization that was dedicated to opposing
climate change policy. 2000 brought the promise that Ford would increase the fuel
efficiency of its SUVs by 25% by 2005. In 2001 Ford moved farther away from the
dominant industry position on climate change with an advertisement that read: "Climate
Change. There. We Said It."
Toyota created the first mass-produced and mass-marketed hybrid electric car in the
United States. In 2001, Toyota Motor Company advanced its "2010 Global Vision," a
framework for the company's growth into the 2010s. Prosperity and growth through
innovation were central to the Vision. The first of four "innovations for the future" was the
movement "Towards a Recycling Based Society" (Toyota 2002). This principal promoted
resource conservation, reuse, and recycling. It committed Toyota to leadership in
environmental technology. Toyota's annual "Environmental and Social Report" detailed the
company's attempts to lower emissions, decrease their contributions to global warming,
lower energy use in production, and other environmental pursuits related to manufacturing
and use of their vehicles.
As members of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Toyota and Ford
participated in the AAM's opposition to the Clean Cars Bill. Environmentalists pressured
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Ford, asking the company not to oppose the legislation. According to Russell Long at
Bluewater Network, "usually when an environmental group picks a corporate target, they
pick them either because they're the most polluting within the industry group or they're the
most likely to turn around. In Ford's case, they happen to have both distinctions" (Long
2005). If Ford peeled off from the industry bloc and agreed not to oppose the legislation,
Toyota was likely to follow. Long invited Ford to help craft the legislation so that it would
not hurt the company. Ford refused the invitation.
According to a representative from the AAM, Toyota and Ford were so concerned
about the impact of negative publicity associated with a ballot initiative to overturn the
legislation that they blocked the action (Anonymous 2005).5 And, an LA. Week y article
reported that, "industry consensus was breached when Toyota -- which is moving on
cleaner-operating hybrid cars and is advised by a state official from the Governor Jerry
Brown years -- expressed deep misgivings. And then Ford came in, expressing neutrality.
The war hawks in the industry camp, General Motors and its ally Daimler Chrysler, were
unable to carry the day" (Bradley 2002). The level of public support that environmentalists
had generated created a context in which individual automakers' desires to protect their
markets trumped their collective interest.
Moving On: The Road Ahead
The law called for the Air Resources Board to draft standards that would achieve the
"maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles." Although automobile manufacturers did not participate in the crafting of the
regulations, they did submit numerous "public comments" through paid consultants
5 The AAM makes decisions by consensus, so individual companies may block actions that the majority of
the group supports.
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(Ogelsby 2005). Representatives from environmental advocacy organizations did contribute
to the development of the standards. The Air Resources Board adopted the regulations in
September 2004. The regulations limit the allowable levels of greenhouse gas emissions
from passenger cars, pickup trucks, and SUVs beginning in model year 2009. The Air
Resources Board anticipates that the regulations will result in an average of 22% reduction of
greenhouse gases from new cars and light trucks in 2012 and about 30% in 2016.
In December 2004, the automobile industry filed a lawsuit to challenge the
regulations. Every carmaker in the world has joined the suit, even Ford and Toyota. The
industry challenges California's authority to pass regulations limiting vehicular carbon
dioxide emissions on the basis that it violates the prohibition of states to regulate fuel
economy, as established in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.
At least eight other states have already or are prepared to adopt the California
standards.6 Canada has used California's standards as a basis for their negotiation with
automakers to create voluntary greenhouse gas emission reduction standards. California
alone represents 13% of the vehicle market in the United States. If the northeast states and
Canada adopt the California standards, more than one-third of the North American vehicle
market would comply with the California greenhouse gas emission standards.
Reflections
Environmentalists won the battle to define the problem because they had a more
compelling story than the auto industry. They convinced enough Californians and legislators
that the legislation was important. Their argument was clear: carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases emitted from automobiles contribute to global warming; global warming
6 The eight states are: Washington, New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode
Island and Maine.
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hurts California; so, Californians should limit their vehicular emissions. This message
resonated with the identity of Californians as leaders in environmental policy and engaged
Californians' sense of environmental responsibility.
The auto industry's message was clearly compelling for some Californians. Their
opposition translated into phone calls and emails to legislators. One angry citizen threatened
to show his opposition by bringing a baseball bat to Assemblywoman Pavley's district office
(Rishoff 2005). However, it did not convince enough Californians to lead to an ultimate
legislative opposition. Several interview respondents thought that the auto industry
misjudged Californians in the way that they framed their message. "Californians drove 730
million miles per day in light-duty vehicles in 2000," according to the Pew Center on Global
Climate Change (2005), so the industry was not making a bad guess when it tried to reach
out to Californians as consumers. However, many people also feel guilty, or at least
ambivalent about driving vehicles that have been vilified in the anti-SUV campaign. A core
message that the auto industry relies on in its opposition of national regulations is personal
economic impacts-job loss. There is only one auto manufacturing plant in California, so
loss of jobs is not a persuasive threat for most Californians.
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IMPLICATION & CONCLUSIONS
This paper traced the tactics that environmentalists and the auto industry used to convince
the public to adopt their positions about the Clean Cars legislation. First hand and media
accounts of support and opposition activities provided evidence to explain how the
environmentalists won the battle for public and legislative support. Collaboration across
environmental organizations and the inclusion of non-environmental institutions,
organizations, and individuals expanded the impact and scope of the support campaign.
Environmentalists' explanation of the need for the legislation and its impacts resonated with
Californians; as did their attack on the credibility of the auto industry. Although the auto
industry succeeded in heightening the bill's controversy and convinced legislators that there
were costs associated with voting in favor of the bill, the environmentalists ultimately
produced a more compelling argument than the auto industry.
The politics associated with the passage of the Clean Cars Bill is not dramatically
different from what one would expect in a high stakes environmental policy debate. The
auto industry told a version of the same story they usually tell in the face of potential
regulatory policies. Similarly, environmentalists used their established strategy of telling
stories of the terrible things that would happen if no action was taken. The relevance of
analyzing the passage of the legislation as a case lies in the importance of the legislation as it
establishes a new tool to address climate change at the state-level.
One might argue that it is no surprise that an aggressive environmental bill
succeeded in California-that it was a good bill put in front of a majority-Democrat
legislature and governor. But, other aggressive pieces of environmental legislation have failed
in California. Proposition 128, also known as the "Big Green" aimed to phase out
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carcinogenic pesticides and ozone depleting chemicals, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
to limit gas and oil drilling in oceans and bays, to require oil spill cleanup plans and funds,
and to appropriate funds for environmental research and protection. Although "Big Green"
appealed to a diversity of environmental interests, its supporters did not compel enough of
the public to adopt it. So, it is not enough that the Clean Cars legislation was introduced in
California. California's environmental history and Democratic state government certainly
were contributing factors to the bill's success, but without a context of citizen support and
they are not enough to explain its passage.
Another counter argument might claim that the success of the bill hinged on the
change of the bill number and that the environmentalists' and the support coalition's efforts
to develop public support was not integral to its passage. Changing the bill number and
amending its content were important to the bill's success; the amendment changes
neutralized the industry arguments and AB 1493 did not have the stigma that AB 1058 had.
The new bill number these changed the choice that legislators faced from one of large public
costs versus large public benefits to one of just large public benefits. But, without an
external context in which the public benefits were clear and in which the auto industry's
argument had been refuted, the internal legislative maneuvers would not have been sufficient
to get legislators to vote in favor of the bill. Environmentalists created a context in which
legislators could get credit for and not fear punishment from supporting the bill.
As of April 2005, six states have committed to adopting California regulations: New
York, Maine, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont. Washington State
has a bill pending that would adopt the California standards. As part of the West Coast
Governor's Initiative on Global Warming, Oregon's governor has committed to pursuing
the standards in the Oregon State Assembly. Maryland's attempt to adopt California
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legislation failed in March 2005. Some of these states may adopt the California standards by
rule-making as opposed to law-making. However, even rule-making on a controversial issue
may become political and will require some degree of strategy for success.
Canada also indicated its intentions to adopt the California regulations. However, in
April 2005, the automobile manufacturing industry agreed to a voluntary reduction of
absolute greenhouse gas emissions from their Canadian fleets by 2010. This alters the total
market share that the standards will affect. But, the technologies that the automakers will
utilize to meet the Canadian fleet reductions will contribute to the market for greenhouse gas
emissions reductions innovations and so will complement the California standards. Canada
has indicated its intention adopt the California standards if automakers do not comply with
the voluntary standards.
The tactics that industry and environmental interests used and citizen, media, and
legislative responses to these offer a blueprint of what to expect in other states as they
attempt to adopt California's regulations. If public support continues to drive the policy
process, environmentalists and the auto industry will focus their energy on convincing the
public of their positions. To do this, the auto industry will rely on scaring consumers with
inflated impacts of the regulations and environmentalists will emphasize local climate change
consequences of not adopting regulations to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Advocates of
future attempts to adopt California standards may rely on the automobile industry's ability to
outspend environmentalists in their attempts to gain public concurrence with their
opposition. Legislators will respond to outraged and impassioned citizen communications.
And, whichever side is able to make a more compelling case will prevail.
In looking at these emergent lessons with the aim of applying them to other states,
there are some differences to keep in mind. First, most state legislatures do not have a
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dependable Democrat majority. California passed the legislation through party concurrence;
Democrats voted to support and Republicans voted to oppose. States whose legislatures
have a balanced mix of party representation cannot depend on Democrat votes alone in
order to successfully pass legislation to adopt California standards.
Second, automobile manufacturing comprises a small proportion of California's
economy. In states where the automobile industry represents a larger share of the economy,
arguments that claim dire economic impacts that would result from the regulations are likely
to resonate more than they do in California.
Third, Californians take climate change more seriously than the rest of the nation.
The Public Policy Institute of California compared Californian's survey responses to the
national average in their 2000 Statewide Survey on the Environment and found that "5 7 % of
Californians believe there is evidence to warrant either immediate action ... or some action...
to address global warming" (PPIC 2000, 14). On a national level, they report that 51% of
people feel this way.
Finally, the automobile manufacturing industry is ready. Automakers anticipate that
other states will try to pass legislation adopting California standards. In fact, the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers is already preparing for such attempts. The lag-time between the
initial hearings of the bill in California's Assembly and the auto industry's active opposition
gave environmentalists time to assemble coalitions, resolve internal discord, and develop
their support messages. The auto industry is unlikely to be caught off-guard again.
Understanding key differences, and the having examined how this process played out
in California, I offer a number of recommendations for advocates of rules or legislation to
adopt California standards.
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Support
Develop bi-partisan support for the legislation before it enters the state's legislature: Having
an internal network of support to rely on that crosses party-affiliation may prevent the issue
of climate change policy from being further framed as a "Democrat issue." State legislators
may find support and assistance from Republicans who have already come out in support of
climate change policies. Figures such as John McCain, and even Republican governors like
Arnold Schwarzenegger or George Pataki who have backed state climate plans may agree to
assist in assembling Republican support. Environmental advocates should reach out to
Republican legislative staff before introducing legislation using arguments of economic
benefits and conservative planning.
Develop coalitions with groups with complementary and overlapping interests. An
example from the California case comes from Bluewater Network's endeavor to gain the
support of the ski industry in the Sierras. The ski industry tends to be politically conservative
and serves a conservative clientele. When Bluewater asked for their support they did not
advance an argument about global impacts, but instead presented data that showed
diminishing ice pack in the Sierras. They engaged the business leaders in conversations about
potential economic losses from a diminishing number of ski-days and eventually gained their
support. Not all groups can be compelled to support vehicular emission standards (or any
environmental policy) with the same set of arguments. It is up to the advocates of legislation
to craft messages to fit the audience.
Environmentalists must work to intertwine their missions with those of unions in
the United States. This is particularly true because Democrats, who are the current base of
climate change policy support, rely on union support and take union positions seriously.
The United Auto Workers (UAW) has consistently sided with the automobile manufacturing
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industry against environmental regulations. The auto industry's threats of job loss that will
result from their competitive disadvantages under the policies speak to a basic necessity of
survival. In states where there is a significant auto manufacturing presence, legislators are
unlikely to vote in favor of a bill that constituents perceive to result in dire economic
consequences. If environmentalists offer a different story, one in which workers will not
lose their jobs to foreign assembly plants, they might be able to gain the UAW as allies,
thereby securing support in state legislatures. To this end, supporters of California standards
should work to create grant funds to assist domestic manufacturing facilities in shifting their
production to low greenhouse gas emissions vehicles.
Health professionals offer a willing but underutilized source of support. One of the
initial supporters of the Clean Cars campaign in California was the American Lung
Association. Listing well-known and trusted public health organizations as supporters
strengthened the bill's credibility. But, public health organizations and professionals can
offer more than their names to pursuits for vehicular emissions regulations. Unlike other
kinds of scientists, medical scientists and public health professionals are not vulnerable to a
loss of credibility when they make prescriptive statements about policies; in fact, the public
expects health and medical scientists to make recommendations about how people should
live and behave. Public health organizations are consistent supporters of climate change
policy, but are not often featured in state-level policy campaigns. A first step in better taking
advantage of support from medical and public health professionals is to co-produce policy
and education promotional materials with them. Outreach and education materials about
vehicular pollution should highlight anticipated public health risks and impacts associated
with climate change.
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Public Education
Nearly 60% of Californians think that Climate Change is real and serious enough to do
something about. Only about half of the nation at-large thinks this is true. A public
education campaign about climate change is imperative to the pursuit of public support for
climate change policies. Environmentalists should look to AIDS awareness and anti-smoking
campaigns as models for mass education. Public education campaigns should clarify what
climate change is and is not, explain how human behavior accelerates climate change, and
ask who really wins and loses when climate policies are not adopted.
Localized research findings about climate change impacts may be combined with
information on traffic congestion, local air quality, respiratory illness, and obesity data to
strengthen arguments for vehicular greenhouse gas emissions regulations. Environmentalists
should take the opportunity to frame the argument for the adoption of California emission
standards so that it addresses other state-specific salient public policy concerns. For
instance, in a state in which there is a lot of public attention focused on health care, the fact
that warmer temperatures exacerbate asthma and other respiratory illnesses will be a
compelling argument for emissions reductions policy. And, such an argument may be
supported on environmental and health grounds.
Research
Examples of localized impacts are embedded in existing research about climate change
impacts in the United States. Supporters of California emissions regulations, or any other
climate change policy, are wise to extract localized implications of climate change to
highlight the importance of a state acting on climate change. The EPA has an on-line library
of targeted research that examines localized impacts of climate change for every state (EPA
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2000). The Union of Concerned Scientists has also published reports that explain climate
change impacts for specific states and regions including the Great Lakes, the Gulf Coast,
California, and Iowa (Union of Concerned Sciences 2005). The U.S. Global Climate Change
Research Program's National Assessment of Potential Consequences of Climate Change and
Variability includes regional analysis of climate impacts for Alaska, the Appalachians,
California, Eastern Midwest, the Great Plains, the Great Lakes, the Great Plains, Gulf Coast,
the Mid-Atlantic, New England, the Pacific Northwest, Rocky Mountain Great Basin area,
South Atlantic, Southeast, and Southwest (USGCRP 2003).
Finally, advocates of adoption of California standards in other states should learn
from each other's experiences. As states attempt adoption processes, advocates in other
states should not only support them but also try to learn from them what works and what
tactics are not helpful.
Conclusion
The California Clean Cars Bill emerges as a hope for environmental progress at a
troublesome time for environmentalists. The majority of environmental actions in the 2000s
have focused on trying to prevent the weakening of environmental laws and regulations that
were the product of three decades of activism. State-level policy is the new venue for
environmental progress and protection in the United States. This thesis explored California
Clean Cars Bill's path to success offers guidance for environmentalists who wish to forge
similar tracks across the country.
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